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R&D Costs and Productivity in Biopharmaceuticals 
 
F. M. Scherer 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
  This article characterizes the activities required to launch a new 
pharmaceutical molecule into the market, summarizes studies that have attempted to 
pinpoint the research and development costs incurred per approved new molecule, 
and analyzes the various critiques levied against published R&D cost estimates.  It 
finds that by any reckoning, R&D costs per approved molecule have risen sharply 
over time, most likely at a rate of approximately 7 percent per year after stripping 
out the effects of general economic inflation. 
 
 
  2
R&D COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN BIOPHARMACEUTICALS 
 
F. M. Scherer 
 
Introduction 
 
  Substantial gains in human health and longevity have been achieved, 
especially since the 1930s, through the development and introduction into clinical 
practice of new pharmaceuticals, ranging inter alia from early antibiotics through 
anti-choleresterol agents to anti-cancer medicines.  Most of the detailed 
development of new pharmaceutical entities has been conducted, at least in 
capitalist nations, by private enterprises, typically subject to detailed regulation by 
government agencies that monitor clinical testing activities and determine whether a 
proposed new drug is safe and efficacious enough to permit marketing.  The 
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research-intensive of all private 
industries. During the early years of the 21st century, however, there was evidence 
of sharply rising R&D costs underlying the average new pharmaceutical entity 
introduced into commercial use and hence reduced research productivity.  This 
article explores the evidence and the issues, with a focus mainly on the United 
States, which has played a leading role in drug development and on which the most 
complete data are available. 
 
   Quantitative Overview 
 
  Figure 1 presents an overview of inputs and outputs for the drug R&D process.   
The solid line traces input trends -- notably, reported R&D expenditures (right-hand 
scale, in billions of dollars) by members of the principal U.S. trade association, the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, i.e., PhRMA.    The data 
have important limitations.    They are adjusted to year 2000 average purchasing 
power levels using the U.S. gross domestic product price deflator, although R&D 
cost inflation (measured from U.S. National Institutes of Health studies) has probably 
proceeded somewhat more rapidly than general economy-wide price inflation.   
Most of the leading pharmaceutical producers are multinational firms, but Figure 1 
includes only the R&D expenditures of PhRMA members within the United States.   
Counting overseas outlays of the members, many with home bases elsewhere, 
would add roughly 25 percent.    Not all private-sector company pharmaceutical R&D 
outlays are made by PhRMA members.    A particularly important exclusion is for 
biotechnology specialists, many of which do not publicly report their R&D outlays.   
Several biotech companies were members of PhRMA in 2008, so their data are 
included in the PhRMA tallies.    But most joined only after incurring the R&D 
underlying successful drug developments, and it would appear that the reported 
PhRMA R&D totals were not recalculated backward to hold membership constant, in 
which case the addition of new members overstates actual growth rates.   
Recognizing these limitations, one can estimate from Figure 1 that inflation-adjusted 
R&D outlays grew between 1970 and 2007 at an average annual rate somewhat  3
below  7.4  percent.   
 
   <Figure  1  near  here> 
 
  The dash-dash line in Figure 1 estimates the number of new molecular entities 
(NMEs) (left-hand scale) approved each year for prescription use in the United 
States.    The count of new molecular entities includes new therapeutic organic 
chemical molecules -- the so-called "small-molecule drugs," excluding new uses of 
already-approved molecules and different formulations of pre-existing molecules, 
plus the typically much larger molecules derived by gene-splicing and related 
biological processes (but excluding vaccines, blood products, and the like).    The 
large molecule drugs, conveniently called "biologicals," are also broken out for 
separate reporting with the dotted line in Figure 1, beginning with the first such new 
entry, a synthetic human growth hormone, in 1982.    Because source counts vary, 
some estimation error cannot be avoided.    It is clear with any set of definitions that 
the number of new drug approvals varies widely from year to year.    The spike 
around 1996 is artificial, resulting from a sharp fee-induced reduction in the Food 
and Drug Administration's backlog of drugs awaiting approval.    When that peak is 
redistributed over subsequent years, one finds a modest upward trend of about 2.1 
percent per year. 
 
  With inflation-adjusted R&D expenditures rising at roughly 7.4 percent per 
year and the approval of new pharmaceutical entities increasing at only 2.1 percent 
year, it appears likely that the average R&D cost of new molecular entities has been 
rising over time. 
 
The R&D Phases 
 
  The discovery and testing of potential new drugs follow a fairly regular 
sequence of stages characterized in Figure 2.    The horizontal time axis is calibrated 
at zero for the year when testing in humans begins.    The vertical axis smooths 
impressionistically annual spending levels in year 2000 dollars, approximating 
averages reported by DiMasi et al. (2003, p. 165) for drugs emerging mainly during 
the 1990s.    The costs assumed are those of a project that goes all the way from 
preclinical work to regulatory approval.    No adjustment is made for uncompleted 
phases, e.g., abandonments or failures.      There is a long period in which basic and 
applied research seeks to find and/or synthesize new molecules and identify 
through theory and in vitro testing which ones might actually work in human beings.   
In the early years of active pharmaceutical research, the discovery process entailed 
mostly random "try every bottle on the shelf" search, but as scientific knowledge has 
advanced, theory has come to play an increasingly important role.    Once a 
promising molecule has been identified, it is tested in animals for possible toxicity. 
 
   <Figure  2  near  here> 
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  If that hurdle is cleared, a stylized set of human testing phases begins, with 
appreciable attrition rates at each phase.    In Phase I, the drug is administered to a 
typically small sample of humans to determine the safety of various dosages and in 
some cases to secure preliminary insight into whether the molecule can alleviate the 
target disease.    If those tests yield promise, targeted Phase II tests for efficacy are 
conducted in larger cohorts.    Success in Phase II is typically followed by much more 
extensive Phase III tests carefully designed with double blinds to infer at reliable 
levels of statistical confidence whether the drug is safe and effective relative to 
placebos or, less often, relative to the best-accepted approved drug in the relevant 
therapeutic category.    Phase III tests, typically divided into at least two distinct 
protocols, may encompass from a few hundred human subjects (only for diseases 
with no known cures) to more than 10,000 individuals.    If the results from Phase III 
are promising, the drug developer (usually a private pharmaceutical company) 
applies for marketing approval -- in the United States, for an NDA (new drug 
approval) issued by the Food and Drug Administration; and in Europe since 1995, to 
the European Medicines Agency.    On average, only one-fifth to one-fourth of the 
small-molecule drugs entering Phase I testing emerge roughly eight years later with 
marketing approval.    For biological therapies developed during the 1990s, the 
survival probabilities appear to be higher -- e.g., roughly 0.3 from a survey by 
DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) and even higher for the earliest approved biologicals, 
which mainly emulated naturally occuring substances.     
 
  The relevant regulatory agency may after approval insist upon additional tests 
to clarify remaining uncertainties, in which case, further trials continue into a Phase 
IV.    Or the company developing the drug may seek to illuminate more exactly the 
differences between its drug and existing competitors, embarking on its own 
initiative into further Phase IV testing. 
 
  For wholly new vaccines (as compared to minor variants adapted annually to 
new strains of influenza) even larger human test samples are often needed.    The 
basic problem is, once a subject acquires the target disease, it may be too late for 
vaccine  administration.  For  preventative vaccines, tests are conducted on 
populations that might be afflicted in the future, and to keep trial periods within 
reasonable time bounds, given small probabilities that any given sample member 
will actually acquire the disease, samples numbering in the tens of thousands may 
be required to achieve acceptable levels of statistical discrimination along with 
detecting adverse reactions.    To be sure, subjects might alternatively be injected 
with the target organism after vaccine administration, as was done for example 
during the 18th Century in the discovery of the first cowpox-based smallpox 
vaccine, but this approach violates medical ethics and is now avoided.     
 
Estimating R&D Cost per Successful New Drug 
 
  Given this broad picture and its many variations, interest has focused on the 
productivity of research and development in yielding new pharmaceutical therapies  5
-- i.e., the cost per successful new molecule.  There  have  been  numerous 
quantitative investigations.    The leading efforts, and those most highly cited in both 
the scientific and popular literature, have come from collaborating economists at 
Tufts University, the University of Rochester, and Duke University.    See e.g. DiMasi, 
Hansen, and Grabowski (2003).    Their methodology, which to minimize the 
proliferation of names will be called the Tufts University studies, enlisted deep 
cooperation from a handful of major pharmaceutical companies (in the most 
comprehensive recent effort, ten) operating in the United States.    The investigators 
began by identifying a set of clinical testing programs undertaken by the 
cooperating enterprises on 68 so-called "self-originated" molecules first tested in 
humans between 1983 and 1994 .    Their sample excluded "licensed-in" drugs 
whose early development was performed by companies other than the survey 
respondents.    Once the molecules entered clinical testing, detailed data on 
individual test program costs and failure rates were obtained so that they could be 
aggregated into estimates of the average cost per successful molecule, i.e., the 
actual out-of-pocket cost of the ultimate successes, into which were loaded the 
probability-adjusted estimates of pre-clinical and clinical phase failure costs.    If, for 
example, only one molecule out of five entering Phase I testing ultimately secured 
marketing approval, the cost of an average Phase I test, successful or unsuccessful, 
was multiplied by 1 / 0.2 = 5 to obtain the average Phase I success cost.    Similar 
probabilistic adjustments were made for later stages.    For the most recent of the 
comprehensive Tufts University studies, the estimated average out-of-pocket cost 
per successfully approved molecule, including the pro-rated costs of failed tests, all 
measured in year 2000 purchasing power levels, were as follows: 
 
  Pre-clinical        $121  million 
  Clinical  testing     $282  million 
 
    Total cost per approved drug        $403 million 
 
  The mean clinical testing estimates, which are undoubtedly more reliable 
than pre-clinical estimates, can be compared with the analogous costs from three 
earlier studies summarized by Scherer (2010, p. 154), each adjusted to year 2000 
purchasing power levels: 
 
 Source       T e s t   P e r i o d           Average  out-of-pocket  cost 
                                           p e r   a p p r o v e d   n e w   d r u g  
 
  M a n s f i e l d       L a t e   1 9 5 0 s             $   5 . 4   m i l l i o n  
  Clymer      Late  1960s       40.2  million 
  Tufts  I       1970-early  1980s            65.7  million 
       Tufts  II      1983-late  1990s             $282  million 
 
It seems clear that the clinical R&D costs of new drugs have exploded over time.   
The particularly large multiplier between the estimates of Edwin Mansfield and  6
Harold Clymer is explained by the fact that after 1962, constrained by new and 
tougher legislation, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration enforced much more 
stringent rules for the evidence it would accept before approving new drug 
applications.    We return to the sizeable increase between Tufts I and II 
subsequently. 
 
  The estimates of success probability-adjusted preclinical R&D costs by the 
Tufts group are more problematic.    For the Tufts II sample, we see above, the mean 
value was $121 million, or 30 percent of total estimated mean cost per successful 
molecule.    For the Tufts I sample (from the 1970s), it was $90 million (in year 2000 
dollars), or 57.8 percent. 
 
  The striking reduction over roughly 15 years in pre-clinical cost shares, not 
explained by the Tufts researchers, is probably attributable to radical changes in the 
way new drugs have been discovered.    The science of drug action in the human 
body advanced by leaps and bounds in the time interval separating the two studies, 
leading among other things to so-called "rational drug design" -- that is, the 
structured synthesis of molecules targeted to interact in particular ways with known 
receptors in the human body.    (A detailed chart of biological pathways is revised 
and published periodically by the Boehringer-Ingelheim Co.; see Michal (1993) in 
the Further Reading.)    Much of the research underlying such insights was 
conducted not in drug company laboratories, but in universities and hospitals 
supported by grants, most notably, from the U.S. National Institutes of Health.   
Between 1983 and 2000, the research budget of "NIH" rose from roughly $2.7 billion 
(at year 2000 GDP price levels) to $14.4 billion, or two-thirds of U.S. R&D outlays by 
PhRMA member firms in 2000.    Additional research support came from the U.S. 
National Science Foundation and private philanthropic institutions.    An unknown but 
undoubtedly substantial fraction of such outlays generated basic knowledge helpful 
in the design of new pharmaceutical entities and in many cases identified specific 
molecules eventually brought into clinical testing by private sector enterprises.   
See e.g. in the suggested readings Scherer (2010) and Stevens et al. (2011). 
 
  Also, the first drug synthesized using radically new gene splicing methods 
was introduced commercially in 1982, spurring the explosive growth of a new 
biotechnology industry, mostly in new companies initially financed by venture 
capital.    Although 90 percent of the entities comprising the Tufts II sample were 
small molecules (as contrasted to biologics), it cannot be ruled out that the sample 
companies saved some pre-clinical R&D expenditures by building upon research 
done inter alia in    biotech enterprises.    However, DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) 
report quite similar constant-dollar R&D cost estimates for their Tufts II sample and a 
slightly later sample covering only biological entities.     
 
 
 
  7
Critiques 
 
  The Tufts estimates and their predecessors have been widely cited by 
pharmaceutical industry advocates to argue that drug testing is both risky and 
costly, and, with additional evidence, that government agencies ought not to 
intervene in pharmaceutical companies' controversial price-setting process (which 
in fact many national governments do through various price control mechanisms).   
Given this, the estimates have been criticized as biased and excessive.    Diverse 
and conflicting critiques are found in Love (2003), Angell (2004), and Light and 
Warburton (2011).    The criticisms have several foci. 
 
Capitalization 
 
  More widely cited than the out-of-pocket averages presented above are 
estimates from the Tufts research of average drug discovery costs, capitalized to 
"present value" at the time of product approval to reflect the cost of capital tied up 
during the R&D period.    In the 1983-late 1990s estimates presented above, for 
example, out-of-pocket costs were capitalized to the time of marketing approval at 
an implied 11 percent cost of capital.    To illustrate, suppose that ten years before a 
new drug's approval date, e.g., at year -2 in Figure 2, out-of-pocket costs amounting 
to $5 million (with adjustments for failed trials) are observed.    The capitalized figure 
becomes $5 million x (1.11
10) = $5 million x 2.59 = $12.97 million, which is the value 
incorporated into the capitalized R&D cost sums.    Here 1.11
10 is the amount to which 
one dollar grows over ten years at compound annual interest.    Such adjustments are 
made for each year to take into account the "opportunity cost" of companies' 
investable funds on the assumption that if the money were not invested in R&D, 
investors could allocate it to other comparably risky assets that over time would 
yield 11 percent inflation-adjusted annual returns (derived from standard finance 
sources using the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model).    For years nearer the time 
of marketing approval, the adjustment is of course smaller; e.g., five years out, 1.11
5 
= 1.685 rather than 2.59.    When these capitalization adjustments are made, among 
other things giving relatively greater weight to pre-clinical as opposed to clinical 
testing costs, the $403 million Tufts II average successful drug development cost 
reported above nearly doubles to $802 million.    For the earlier Tufts I study, 
average out-of-pocket costs (pre-clinical plus clinical) rise in year 2000 dollars from 
$156 milion uncapitalized to $318 million capitalized. 
 
  This capitalization assumption, typically reported in the popular press without 
explanation, has been criticized by e.g. Light and Warburton (2011) on both 
conceptual and numerical grounds.    To be sure, most estimates of investment 
outlays for research and development as well as physical facilities, advertising, and 
much else, are typically publicized in unadjusted form for the year of incurrence 
rather than with capitalization, and consistency in reporting practice would argue for 
avoiding capitalization, unless the rationale is clearly explained.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
clear that R&D outlays do have opportunity costs, and in drug discovery and testing,  8
with their long time lags between outlay and the return of profits, the opportunity 
costs are more significant than for investments with quicker paybacks.    Public 
controversy over the capitalization issue became sufficiently intense in the early 
1990s that a specially created U.S. government agency study team focused on it, 
among other things obtaining consulting assistance from prominent finance 
theorists.    Its report was in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
(1993).    The study group concluded (p. 7) that the three most important components 
of R&D investment are "money, time, and risk" and (p. 66) that "the practice of 
capitalizing costs to their present value in the year of market approval is a valid 
approach to measuring R&D costs...."    Given the lack of public understanding, 
however, it would undoubtedly be good practice for journalists to report 
out-of-pocket costs along with capitalized cost estimates. 
 
  The higher the interest rate used in capitalization, the larger is the multiple 
between out-of-pocket and capitalized costs.    Light and Warburton argue (2011, p. 
41) that the 11 percent interest rate used by the Tufts group was too high, given that 
U.S. Government Office of Management and Budget guidelines in 2003 called for 
applying a 3 percent interest rate in evaluating public capital outlays.    This criticism 
is clearly wrong.    Governments like the United States (at least up to the year 2012) 
financed their deficits with what were widely considered "risk-free" bonds that 
indeed often bore quite low interest rates.    But the common stock with which 
corporations are financed is riskier and bears considerably higher implicit interest 
rates.    Addressing this issue, finance experts advising the U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment found (p. 67) that the cost of capital (i.e., the implicit interest rate) for 
established pharmaceutical companies in the 1980s and early 1990s was on the 
order of 8 to 10 percent after stripping away inflation premia.    They found too that 
R&D-intensive activities were more risky than ordinary corporate investments, 
calling for interest rate premia on the order of 4.5 percentage points, or 
approximately 13 to 14 percent over-all.    Recognizing this, the 11 percent implicit 
interest rate used by the Tufts group appeared consistent with broader knowledge 
and perhaps even conservative for the time period covered. 
 
Tax Benefits 
 
  Some critics have argued that tax savings realized by corporations as a result 
of their R&D outlays (treated as current expenses under prevailing tax accounting) 
ought to be deducted in estimates of what drug development costs.    It is true that 
tax offsets exist.    Considering first only the corporate income tax, when a 
corporation spends an incremental dollar on R&D, that dollar reduces its current 
pre-tax profits by a dollar (assuming profits to be positive), and at the 35 percent 
U.S. corporate income tax rate prevailing at the time of the most recent Tufts study, a 
savings of 35 cents is achieved.    The problem with adjusting for this saving is that it 
applies for any incremental expenditure in a positive-income regime -- for the cost 
of hiring an additional worker, for the cost of fuel, for the cost of environmental 
cleanup activities, and so on.    But to apply such adjustments for every expenditure  9
requires distinctions between optional and mandatory outlays and runs into the 
difficulty that, if every expenditure were treated as less costly than its out-of-pocket 
cost, expenditures could rise to exhaust the profits against which savings are 
claimed.    Also, multinational pharmaceutical companies have been adept at shifting 
their reported profits to nations with low marginal income tax rates, so any attempt 
to offset R&D outlays by tax savings would have to cope with a multiplicity of savings 
rates. 
 
  A somewhat better case can be made for adjusting R&D outlays for tax 
benefits specific to R&D.    These were of two main relevant forms.    Under U.S. law 
since the 1980s, credits against income tax liability have been offered for increases 
in R&D expenditures relative to the amount expended in specified base years.    The 
provisions of the law have varied from time to time, so adjustments would be 
complex.    Because the credits apply only to incremental outlays above a base year 
value, it would be difficult to determine which outlays in a large R&D budget are 
incremental and which are within the no-credit baseline.    Special 50 percent federal 
income tax credits have also been offered under U.S. law since 1983 for costs 
incurred testing so-called "orphan" drugs, i.e., those expected to serve    small 
patient populations.    Since the credits are targeted at specific molecules, 
adjustments to orphan drug R&D costs would be more feasible than adjustment for 
generalized tax savings.    We return later to other complexities of estimating orphan 
drug R&D costs.     
 
  More generally, the genuine issues posed by capitalization and tax benefits 
are best judged in policy evaluations of pharmaceutical companies' aggregate net 
profitability, not with respect to specific drug discovery and testing cost estimates.   
There too issues arise, although they are beyond the scope of this essay.    The Office 
of Technology Assessment study concluded (1993, p. 24) that established 
pharmaceutical firms' rates of return on net capital averaged two to three 
percentage points higher than their cost of capital, estimated to be roughly 10 
percent after taxes.    The OTA group refrained from rendering a clear value 
judgment as to whether such a premium was problematic, given the risks of new 
drug development and the desirability of attracting new investment. 
 
Sample Representativeness 
 
  Without doubt the most compelling criticism of the Tufts methodology is that 
their samples may not have been representative of the entire drug development 
universe.    For the Tufts II estimates, the unnamed product sample and cost data 
came from ten pharmaceutical firms, eight of them from the top 20 in terms of sales 
volume -- i.e., the representatives of what many call "Big Pharma."    It is conceivable 
that the drugs chosen for development by those companies differed from those 
developed by smaller firms or even misrepresented the respondents' typical 
portfolios.    In particular, with vast sales pipelines to fill, the companies may have 
emphasized candidates with a large sales potential -- i.e., with luck, the  10
"blockbusters."  For  example,  drugs  that  address widespread health conditions and 
that are prescribed for chronic as contrasted to acute symptoms tend to have better 
sales prospects than those targeting relatively rare and/or acute conditions -- e.g., 
those with the mandate, "Take two tablets per day for ten days and if the symptoms 
persist, see your doctor."    Higher sales prospects, both theory and statistical 
analyses reveal, induce more lavish R&D outlays.    See Scherer (2010), pp. 560-564.     
 
  The testing strategies mandated by the Food and Drug Administration or 
favored by the companies may also have differed.    For drugs that will be taken 
daily for years on end, regulators tend to be more wary of rare and/or cumulative 
adverse side effects and require larger samples to impart additional statistical 
confidence on what might otherwise be seen as clinical testing  flukes.  And  for 
drugs alleviating chronic medical problems of long standing, new drugs will often 
have to compete with existing therapies that may arguably be less effective, but the 
differences are foreseen to be sufficiently small that tests are authorized not against 
placebos, but against established molecules, with unusually large clinical 
populations to obtain evidence bolstering marketing claims that the new drug is in 
fact superior to existing alternatives. 
 
  A case history at the opposite extreme is seen in the first drugs effective 
against HIV/AIDS, recognized as a threat by physicians only in the 1980s.    The 
lethality of AIDS was so shocking, and its spread so rapid, that clinicians and 
regulators accepted major shortcuts to ensure that weapons against the disease 
were at hand.    The first candidate, AZT (also known as Zidovudine), was approved 
by the Food and Drug Administration in March 1987 -- only 25 months after the start 
of human testing, breaking post-1962 speed  records.  Although  comparative 
placebo tests were conducted, the decisive trial included only 282 patients, and 
instead of waiting to see whether or how long AZT recipients lived, FDA evaluated 
the drug's efficacy mainly on the basis of "surrogate endpoints" -- i.e., measures of 
retroviral levels in trial subjects' blood.    Clinical trials were conducted jointly by 
Duke University, Burroughs-Wellcome, and the National Institutes of Health, with 
substantial financial support from the NIH.    Another AIDS drug, Nevirapine, with the 
remarkable ability significantly to inhibit transmission of the disease from infected 
mothers to newborn children, was approved in June 1996 after trials spanning 76 
weeks on a total of 549 patients, one branch conducted by the U.S. NIH in parallel 
with other tests by the drug's inventor, Boehringer-Ingelheim of Germany.    See 
Love (2003).     
 
  The initial AIDS drug developments shared two distinguishing bureaucratic 
characteristics.    For one, the early AIDS population was sufficiently small that the 
first therapeutic candidates were ruled at the outset to be "orphan drugs"    -- i.e., 
mainly targeted toward conditions afflicting 200,000 or fewer individuals in the 
United States.    Second, they were also accorded "priority" status by the Food and 
Drug Administration -- i.e., for molecules offering potentially major improvements 
over already marketed therapies, as distinguished from "standard" drugs yielding  11
more modest therapeutic gains. 
 
  As we have seen, private funds devoted to orphan drug testing have been 
accorded in the United States especially favorable tax status, and clinical testing 
support by Federal government entities is also common.    Recognizing the possibly 
small market potential of orphan drugs, the Food and Drug Administration has 
tended to accept smaller clinical trial samples than for drugs targeting wider 
markets.    Also, because of the tax implications, data are publicly available on the 
total amount spent for orphan drug testing.    For 16 new orphan chemical entities 
approved in the United States between 1998 and 2000, the average clinical trial cost 
per approved orphan, pro-rating the costs of failed tests, was $34 million.    See Love 
(2003, p. 7).    This is far below the $282 million out-of-pocket for the most recent 
Tufts sample, the bulk of whose testing outlays occurred in years earlier and hence 
were less inflated than those gleaned by James Love.    Although DiMasi et al. (2003) 
do not elaborate the point, the Office of Technology Assessment reported (1993, p. 
232) that roughly two-thirds of orphan drug designations went to companies that 
were not PhRMA members.     
  
  Orphan drugs are also more likely to obtain priority rankings from the Food 
and Drug Administration than standard drugs.    Thus, for new chemical entities 
approved by the FDA during the first five years of the 21st Century, 89 percent of the 
orphans had priority ratings, as compared to 38 percent for the standard drugs.   
Scherer (2010, p. 163). Since the early 1990s, the Food and Drug Administration has 
tended to process non-orphan priority drug approval requests more rapidly than 
standard requests.    It is also possible that FDA demands fewer and less costly 
clinical trials for priority drugs, but on this the evidence is sparse. DiMasi et al. 
(2003, p. 172) report that in their Tufts II sample, the out-of-pocket clinical testing 
costs of priority drugs exceeded the average cost of standard drugs by a statistically 
insignificant amount.    The difference was even smaller for capitalized costs, 
implying that test-to-approval lags were shorter for the priority drugs.    DiMasi et al. 
suggest that priority drugs may have been more costly to test because they break 
newer scientific ground, requiring more learning-by-doing, and also (p. 172) 
because "firms have the incentive to do more wide-ranging and costly testing on 
drugs that have the potential to be both clinically and commercially significant."   
Whether this inference carries over to the non-orphan priority drugs tests of smaller 
companies is unknown. 
 
An Independent Test of the Evidence 
 
  There are other fragments of evidence suggesting average out-of-pocket 
costs lower for drugs outside the Tufts sample than for in-group molecules.    But now 
we advance to an alternative approach.    Several authors, such as Adams and 
Branter (2005), have pursued more aggregative approaches to the problem of 
estimating drug development costs.    Here I report the result of my own broad-brush 
approach.  The  methodology  is  simple:  dividing annual counts of new therapeutic  12
entity approvals in the United States into the reported intra-United States research 
and development spending of PhRMA members.    It is bound to be incomplete and 
inexact for at least four reasons.    First, PhRMA's membership    includes companies 
with a home base outside the United States, and by excluding overseas R&D outlays, 
the full costs of their drugs approved in the United States are certain to be 
underestimated.    Second, many of the drugs approved in the United States come 
from non-PhRMA members, and while such firms' innovations are included in the 
denominator of cost/drug calculations, their R&D outlays are excluded from the 
numerator, again resulting in an underestimate.    Over the years 2001-2005, the 
non-PhRMA share of approved new medical entities was 51 percent, implying a 
sizeable downward bias.    Third, the R&D expenditures of PhRMA members are 
focused not only on developing and testing new molecular entities, but also testing 
to see whether existing molecular entities are effective against additional disease 
conditions, developing vaccines and other biological products, and reformulating 
inert binders that control the timing of a drug's release into the blood stream.    And 
much Phase IV research undertaken by major pharmaceutical firms is aimed not at 
complying with regulatory agency mandates, but to strengthen evidence used in 
field marketing of already approved molecules.    By excluding such projects from 
the denominator count, the cost per drug, new and old, is overestimated.    And 
finally, as we have seen in Figure 2, the R&D expenditures underlying new entities 
precede by as much as a decade the date of approval.    Lags must be accounted for, 
but are inherently variable. 
 
  Recognizing that perfection is unattainable, the following methodology was 
pursued.    The Figure 1 time series of new molecular entity approvals for the years 
1974 through 2007, including both small-molecule drugs and some biologicals (but 
not vaccines and the like) was used as the denominator of the cost calculation.    Total 
reported R&D expenditures of PhRMA members in the United States were used, 
adjusted with the Gross Domestic Product deflator to constant year 2000 price levels, 
to measure costs.    To reflect the fact that approvals lag the incurrence of testing 
costs, the R&D series was pre-lagged by four years relative to approvals, e.g., 
approvals in the year 2000 were related to 1996 R&D expenditures.  This  convention 
reflects in a crude way the central tendency of the outlay flow shown in Figure 2, 
with outlays peaking three years before approval but with early outlays weighted 
more heavily due to attrition. 
 
  The Tufts II analysis focused on drugs whose clinical test expenditures were 
mostly incurred between 1983 and 1999.    Within that restricted sample of years, the 
computed average out-of-pocket cost R&D per lagged new molecular entity 
approved, using the methodology described above, was $306 million in year 2000 
dollars (also used as the measuring basis for Tufts group's summary estimates).   
When the exercise was repeated without the inclusion of biological entities, the 
average was $390 million.    The Tufts II estimate, including seven biologicals (10 
percent of the sample) was $282 million.    The difference is small, suggesting that for 
an intrinsically difficult measurement, the Tufts estimates are both credible and  13
perhaps even conservative. 
 
  For the full 1974-2007 molecular approval series, the average growth rate of 
constant-dollar R&D costs per molecule was found by regression analysis, which 
smooths year-to-year variations, to be 6.5 percent per year with biologicals included 
and 7.2 percent per year with them excluded.    DiMasi et al. (2003, p. 151) estimated 
the growth rate between their Tufts I and Tufts II studies, spanning slightly shorter 
intervals, to be 7.4 percent.    Again, the conclusion seems inescapable that there has 
been substantial growth in R&D costs per new approved molecule, or in other 
words, a decline in research productivity.     
 
Reasons for Change 
 
  Several hypotheses vie to explain the apparently continuous increase in R&D 
costs per molecule approved.    Despite advances in the technology of pre-clinical 
small-molecule screening, one might suppose that diminishing returns would set in 
after seven or more decades of active discovery, among other things forcing 
companies to focus on more difficult therapeutic targets.    During the 1990s it was 
thought that the perfection of large-molecule gene-splicing techniques would 
reverse any such tendency and usher in a new golden age of pharmaceutical 
discovery.    However, the observable changes thus far have been less than 
revolutionary.   
 
  There is definite evidence that clinical trial sizes have risen over time, partly 
as a result of tougher standards established by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration.    Also, as individual therapeutic classes became more crowded, 
companies may have elected to increase sample sizes to improve the statistical 
significance of results touted in competitive marketing. For three therapeutic 
categories studied by the Office of Technology Assessment (1993, p. 145), average 
enrollment in Phase I through III clinical trials rose from 2,237 for drugs approved in 
1978-1983 to 3,174 for 1986-1990 entities, implying a median year growth rate of 4.7 
percent.    The average number of subjects drawn into Phase IV grew much more 
rapidly, from 413 to 2000 [sic], or 21 percent per year.   Using  publicly  available 
data, DiMasi et al. estimate (2003, p. 177) that average trial sizes in the 1980s and 
1990s rose at a rate of 7.47 percent per year.    In addition, the complexity of trials 
rose.    DiMasi et al. report (2003, p. 162) from an outside data source that the 
number of procedures administered per trial subject increased between 1990 and 
1997 by 120 percent for Phase I trials, by 90 percent for Phase II trials, and by 27 
percent for Phase III trials.    Weighting the phase growth percentages by the 
fraction of out-of-pocket costs incurred per phase, this implies an average growth of 
50 percent in seven years, or 5.8 percent per year. 
 
  Clinical trials are mostly conducted in hospitals and similar medical centers.   
Over the period 1970 to 1990, the cost of a day of hospitalization in the United States 
rose at an average rate of 11 percent per year -- nearly twice the rate at which the  14
gross domestic product price index was increasing.    It seems reasonable to assume 
that in-hospital test costs rose commensurately.  There  is  also  reason to believe that 
major hospitals view their clinical testing activities as a "profit center" and dump 
some of their soaring overhead costs onto the well-heeled pharmaceutical firms 
sponsoring clinical trials.     
 
  A more speculative hypothesis is that "Big Pharma" companies have allowed 
organizational slack to accumulate in their R&D activities, especially after numerous 
large-company mergers failed to achieve substantial increases in the output of new 
therapeutic entities.    See Munos (2009), pp.  965-966.  A  correction against this 
trend may have begun in the second decade of the 21st Century as pharmaceutical 
giants such as Pfizer and Merck, acknowledging disappointment over the lagging 
productivity of their innovation efforts, cut back their R&D staffs in the wake of major 
new mergers. 
 
  Conclusion 
 
  In sum, the research and clinical testing costs underlying pharmaceutical 
innovations have risen greatly over recent decades to levels measured in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars per approved new molecule.    The most widely 
publicized estimates of R&D costs, sometimes poorly understood, are consistent with 
alternative  estimates.  There would probably be less controversy over those 
estimates if more detailed data on sample composition were disclosed, but 
confidentiality constraints imposed in exchange for access to company microdata 
may preclude this.    It is clear that clinical success may be achieved at substantially 
lower cost with alternative models of pharmaceutical development and testing, but 
embracing those alternatives requires streamlined regulatory and organizational 
approaches and sacrifices in the richness of the evidence on the basis of which 
physicians must make subsequent prescription choices.  15
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